



United States Department of State

Focus on the Issues
EUROPE

Excerpts of testimony speeches, and remarks by
U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright
on Kosovo, NATO, Russia, and Bosnia

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and remarks by the Secretary see the State
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Foreword

Focus on the Issues: Europe is the first in a planned series of six publications of excerpts from testimony, speeches, and remarks by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright that highlight U.S. policy on key issues. The series will include four regional publications—Europe, Africa, the Americas, and Asia—and two thematic—building peace and security around the world and strengthening civil society and the rule of law.

This publication highlights American foreign policy objectives in Europe from 1997 until present. Major topics include the enlargement and modernization of NATO, Russia's democratic transition, building peace in Bosnia, and reversing ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

Kosovo Kosovo

Address to the people of Kosovo

Pristina, Kosovo

July 29, 1999

Good afternoon Kosovo! As United States Secretary of State, and as a friend, I want to thank you all for this wonderful welcome, along with my colleagues Bernard Kouchner of the United Nations.

And let there be no mistake. As long as you choose, Kosovo will remain your home. You have been through a terrible ordeal this past year and more. Much has been lost that cannot be regained. But an opportunity exists now to answer the question, "What kind of a home will you build?" "What kind of a Kosovo do you want?"

I hope that today, we may pledge that, here in Kosovo, never again will people with guns come in the night; never again will houses and villages be burned; and never again will there be massacres and mass graves.

Let us pledge that in Kosovo there will be a new birth of freedom, based on tolerance, law and respect for every human life.

The United States and its partners want to help you build the new Kosovo. This is reflected in the work of KFOR and the steady progress being made in establishing the United Nations civilian presence here. It is reflected in the promise of countries throughout Europe and beyond to provide support for reconstruction and recovery, including America's pledge of up to \$500 million for immediate needs.

And it is reflected in our support for the International War Crimes Tribunal; because we believe that justice is a parent to peace; that those indicted for ethnic cleansing and murder should be held legally accountable; and that Slobodan Milosevic should answer for his crimes.

Today, I ask you as a friend to help and cooperate with KFOR, and the United Nations, and other agencies working here. If problems arise, don't be afraid to speak your mind, but also be patient. Remember they cannot be everywhere and do everything; their job is to aid all Kosovars equally; and their goal is to help your dream of a democratic and peaceful Kosovo come true.

Now, I do not have to tell you there are those who believe Kosovo will never escape its past. They say that you will act toward the Serbs as the Serb military and police acted toward you; that you will make it impossible for Serbs to live in Kosovo. These critics point to tragedies such as the cowardly murder this past week of 14 Serbs in Gracko, and they say "see, we are right. The Kosovo Albanians are no better than Milosevic."

Today, I want to make a prediction that you will prove those critics wrong. Your leaders understand that when an ethnic Albanian murders a Serb, he commits a crime against his own cause and against the future of Kosovo. Democracy cannot be built on revenge. And you will not have the support of the world if you are intolerant and take the law into your own hands.

I cannot tell you how to feel. No one can, who is not in your shoes. But I do ask you to embrace one principle, which is the foundation of all democracy. And that principle is that every person has the right to be judged not by his or her parentage or religious faith, but by their actions and character.

If there is to be a true victory in Kosovo, it cannot be a victory of Albanians over Serbs, or NATO over Serbs. It must be a victory of those who

believe in the rights of the individual over those who do not. Otherwise, it is not victory. It is merely changing one form of repression for another. And I know you want more for Kosovo than that.

The fighting is over. Let us together win the peace. Let us make Kosovo an example for the world to follow. Let us create a democratic Kosovo, within a stable Southeast Europe, within a Europe whole and free.

I have thought about all of you for a very long time. I have thought about the suffering that you have gone through. And I have thought about the future that you have ahead of you.

I have waited for a day like today when I could come to Pristina to share a very special time with you, a time of hope and opportunity.

Having now seen you in person and having felt the warmth of your greeting, let me once again pledge my own best efforts on behalf of the United States in rebuilding and renewing your permanent home.

Thank you all very much and let us now build the peace together. ■

*Remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations
New York City
June 28, 1999*

Thank you very much, Les, and good evening to you all. . . .

NATO's confrontation with Belgrade over Kosovo has ended in accordance with the conditions the alliance set. Now we face the even harder task of building a lasting peace there and throughout south-east Europe. . . .

Assembling the nuts and bolts of a durable peace in Kosovo is a daunting challenge. Our expectations should be realistic. The mission will take time; complaints will surely be heard. And despite KFOR's presence, the danger of violence will persist. . . .

Success will require an extraordinary team effort. . . .

Notwithstanding all this, I am hopeful for three reasons.

First, for most of the past decade, Kosovar Albanians coped with Serb repression by maintaining parallel political, educational, and social structures. They have experience managing institutions.

Second, in past weeks, I have seen an extraordinary determination on the part of European officials to get this job done and done right. This is true from London to Helsinki and from Ankara to Lisbon. Failure is not an option.

Third, the international community has learned some hard lessons in recent years about the do's and don'ts of building peace in post-conflict situations.

It is essential that, in Kosovo, these lessons be heeded. The military and civilian components must work together well both internally and with each other. Both must make effective use of their mandates and focus on results. Donors must back them not just with promises, but with resources of sufficient quantity and timeliness to make a difference. And above all, we must have faith that the mission's underlying principles of democracy and tolerance, economic reform, and the rule of law are the right ones for all the people of Kosovo.

Now, there are some who see an insurmountable obstacle in the desire of many Kosovars for immediate independence—a position that neither NATO nor governments in the region support. Having met with the Kosovar leadership, I know the yearning for independence is powerful. But I also know that Belgrade's withdrawal has altered the reality within which the people of Kosovo will formulate their aspirations. Until now, independence has seemed the only alternative to repression.

But in the future, Kosovars will have something they've never had, which is genuine self-government. They will be out from under Milosevic's boot, with the freedom to choose their own leaders and shape the laws by which they are governed. Milosevic, meanwhile, won't be able to arrest so much as a jaywalker in Kosovo. And his henchmen won't have the capacity to intimidate Kosovars or deny them their rights. That's why the Kosovar Albanian leadership signed onto the Rambouillet Accords, despite the absence of an independence guarantee—and why I will go out on a limb and predict that KFOR will receive strong cooperation from most Kosovars in the months ahead.

Another key issue is whether the new Kosovo will include its ethnic Serb, Roma, and other minorities and whether they will be able to live safely now that Belgrade's forces have been withdrawn. Given the extent of destruction inflicted by Serbs, the risk is obvious that some ethnic Albanians will take the law

into their own hands. Many unacceptable incidents have already occurred. But KFOR takes seriously its mandate to protect all Kosovars, including Serbs. And its effectiveness will increase as deployment continues and demilitarization gains steam.

Kosovo will be a better place if Serbs who did not commit crimes stay and help rebuild. But that is their decision to make. We will measure our success by whether the rights of all those who choose to live in Kosovo are respected. The same principle, incidentally, should apply elsewhere in the region. The international community must continue to press for the safe return of other refugees, including ethnic Serbs to the Krajina region of Croatia. This is crucial, for there could be few greater gifts to the 21st century than to bust the ghosts of Balkans past and consign Milosevic's tactics of hate to the trashbin of history.

Even as we work to help Kosovo regain its feet, we are acting to secure the future of the region. With our partners in the European Union playing a big role, we have launched a pact to stabilize, transform, and eventually integrate all of southeast Europe into the continent's democratic mainstream. We undertake this effort because it's right but also because it is smart. For we know that America cannot be secure unless Europe is secure, which it will not be if its southeast corner remains wracked by division and strife.

Our strategy, with our partners, is to apply the model of help and self-help reflected in the Marshall Plan half a century ago, and in efforts to aid democratization in central Europe this decade. In this spirit, President Clinton will meet with his counterparts in the region this summer.

Together, they will discuss ways to mobilize the resources of a wide range of governments and organizations, while coordinating with the European Union and World Bank. Our intention is to work urgently and effectively with leaders in southeast

Europe as they strive to attract capital, raise living standards, reconcile ethnic and religious tensions, and promote the rule of law.

In this way, we hope over time to enable countries throughout the region to participate fully in the major economic and political institutions of the transatlantic community. This would greatly serve America's interest in expanding the area within Europe where wars simply do not happen. And it would mark another giant step toward the creation of a continent whole and free.

We don't start from square one but, rather, with a strong base of democratic leadership. Hungary has already joined NATO. Hungary and Slovenia are well along in accession negotiations with the EU. And officials in Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Albania, and Croatia demonstrated throughout the recent crisis that they want their societies to grow, prosper, and live in peace.

The same is true of Montenegro, where President Djukanovic and his people endured grave danger without wavering in their support for democratic principles. They have earned the right to participate in our initiative.

We look forward, as well, to welcoming a new Serbia, because our efforts at regional integration cannot fully succeed until that occurs. But Serbia will not receive help, except humanitarian relief, until it is democratic and Milosevic is out of work—or, better yet, in jail.

This is only common sense. Milosevic led Serbia into four wars this decade. He has been indicted for crimes against humanity. He has lied repeatedly to his own people and to the world. His regime is hopelessly corrupt. He portrays himself as a hero, but he is a traitor to every honorable Serb and has no place in the region's future. . . .

By acting with unity and resolve, NATO reaffirmed its standing as an effective defender of stability and freedom in the region. It validated the strategy for modernizing the alliance approved at the

Washington Summit in April. And it underlined the importance of the leading nations on both sides of the Atlantic acting together in defense of shared interests and values.

If we are as resolute in building peace as we were persistent in conflict, the crisis in Kosovo may come to be viewed as a turning point in European history. In the past, Balkan strife has torn Europe apart, and big powers took sides and made local fights their own. The Dayton Accords established a new model of nations coming together to promote peace. Milosevic gambled that Kosovo would prompt a reversion to the earlier model, splitting the alliance and opening an unbridgeable gap between Russia and the West. Thanks to a careful assessment of mutual interests in Moscow and allied capitals, he was wrong.

Russia and NATO did not see eye to eye on the use of force against Belgrade. But both wanted to prevent the conflict from spreading, and following President Clinton's lead, we worked together to bring the conflict to an end. And now, with Russia in KFOR, we are working together to sustain the peace. . . .

Not long ago, I visited a refugee camp in Macedonia. And I was never prouder to be an American than when I heard the chant "USA, USA, USA" and saw a little boy's hand-lettered sign that read, at the top, "I Love America," and at the bottom, "I want to go home." As someone whose own family was twice forced to flee its home when I was still a little girl, I remember how it feels to be displaced. And now I know how it feels, as Secretary of State, to be able to tell that little boy and his family that with America's help, they would go home safely and soon.

There are some who say that Americans need not care what happens to that child or to those like him. Others suggest that until we can help all the victims of ethnic violence, we should be consistent and not

help any. Still others believe that by trying to bring stability to the Balkans, we're taking on a job that is simply too hard. Finally, there are some—overseas and even here at home—who see NATO's actions as part of a master plan to impose our values on the world.

Such criticisms are not original. They echo voices heard half a century ago when America led in rebuilding war-torn societies across two oceans, helped to reconcile historic enemies, elevated the world's conception of human rights, and attempted and achieved the impossible by supplying more than 2 million people in Berlin entirely by air for more than 9 months.

From that time to this, the United States has defended its own interests, while promoting values of tolerance and free expression that are not "Made in America" or confined to the West, but rather universal and fundamental to world progress and peace. It is in this spirit of melding present interests with timeless values—a spirit fully in keeping with the highest traditions of U.S. foreign policy—that we have acted in Kosovo, and that we strive now for lasting peace throughout southeast Europe. ■

*Remarks at Commencement Ceremony,
Georgetown University
Washington, DC
May 29, 1999*

. . . There are those who say it is not smart to stand up to ethnic cleansing in Kosovo because by so doing, we upset powerful countries. Others say it is not consistent because NATO does not intervene in every place where outrages are committed. Still others say it is not prudent because Kosovo is small and distant and the fate of its people shouldn't matter to us very much. To all this, I can only reply with a revered term of American diplomacy: Nuts.

The great lesson of this century is that when aggression and brutality go unopposed, like a cancer, they spread. And what begins as a treatable sickness in one part of the body can rapidly endanger the whole.

The risk is especially high in the Balkans, where World War I began, bitter fighting in World War II occurred, and the worst violence in a half-century took place earlier in this decade.

Many of you, like me, are students of history. And we know that America will never be fully secure if Europe is not stable, that Europe will never be fully stable until its south-east corner is at peace, and that southeast Europe will never be at peace until Slobodan Milosevic—who has now started four wars—is stopped.

Over the past 2 months, this truth has been seared into our hearts. We don't know for sure how many innocent people in Kosovo have been victim-

ized by Milosevic's troops. But the evidence is that the vast majority of the ethnic Albanians have been driven from their homes.

We have reports of 500 villages burned or largely destroyed; 60 villages where executions have occurred and women and girls being systematically raped; of men being taken from their families and never seen again; of mass grave sites in, among other places, Pusto Selo and Izbica, Maliseo, and Drenica.

These names may sound strange to our ears, but they represent real communities where people came together to conduct business, educate their children, and worship God.

Perhaps we should substitute for Pusto Selo and Izbica, more familiar names such as Rosslyn and Georgetown and Adams Morgan and Cleveland Park, and imagine them torched and plundered and our neighbors and family members murdered, abused, and expelled. Perhaps we should imagine that the hand outstretched, asking for help, is that of the person sitting next to us right now.

Those who say we should substitute reason for force in dealing with Milosevic have very short memories, for we have tried that repeatedly. For more than a year, we tried to negotiate a settlement. Last October, we brokered a cease-fire and deployed international monitors to verify it. Milosevic used the time to mass 40,000 troops on Kosovo's border and to plan his current campaign of terror.

That is why we insist that the crisis must end on NATO's terms, not because we are being macho, but because there is no way the refugees will or should return without a credible military force to protect them. And to be credible, that force must have NATO at its core.

As for those who appear to see moral equivalence between Milosevic's actions and those of NATO, they're not seeing very well. Milosevic's brutality

made NATO's response necessary, and in responding, NATO has taken great pains to prevent and limit civilian casualties. On the whole, alliance operations have been more precise than any comparable campaign in history, and we have expressed deep regret for the few mistakes made.

The best that can be said for Milosevic is that he doesn't kill people by accident. On the contrary, the death and destruction of Kosovo's Albanian community is the whole point of Milosevic's war.

Certainly, there are no easy answers in Kosovo. But I, for one, would rather respond to questions about why NATO has acted than try to explain why NATO did not act in the face of ethnic cleansing in its own front yard.

This commencement ceremony is about the future, and so is NATO's strategy in Kosovo. If we are to accept what Milosevic is doing, we would invite further atrocities from him and encourage others to follow his example. That's why NATO must not and will not back down. And it's why we strongly support the International War Crimes Tribunal, which earlier this week indicted Milosevic and four of his henchmen for crimes against humanity.

These historic indictments matter because they demonstrate to Milosevic's victims that the world cares. They demonstrate to Milosevic's minions that the world is watching. And they demonstrate to Milosevic's people that the world understands who is responsible for this conflict and who is prolonging it.

The future is also why we are launching an initiative with our European partners that will help countries throughout the Balkans to become full members of the Euro-Atlantic community, including Serbia should it become democratic. Our purpose is to do for southeast Europe what we did for the west after World War II and for central Europe after the

Cold War—and by succeeding, put the last piece in place of a Europe without walls, wholly free and fully at peace.

During World War II, America didn't just fight Hitler, we responded against Fascism. During the Cold War, we didn't just fight Stalin, we were standing up against communism. Today, we are not just fighting Milosevic, we are standing against the sick idea that the way to settle differences is not through debate, democracy, and negotiation but through murder.

As I said earlier, yours is the last graduating class of the 20th century. It has been a bloody century. We owe it to you and to the children you will raise to do everything we can now to see that the new century is not cursed with the plagues of the old. . . . ■

*Testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, DC
April 20, 1999*

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Senators. I am pleased to appear before you concerning U.S. and NATO policy toward the crisis in Kosovo. . . .

Kosovo is a small part of a region with large historic importance and a vital role to play in Europe's future.

The region is a crossroads where the Western and Orthodox branches of Christianity and the Islamic world meet. It is where World War I began, major battles of World War II were fought, and the worst fighting in Europe since Hitler's surrender occurred in this decade.

Its stability directly affects the security of our Greek and Turkish allies to the south and our new allies Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic to the north. Kosovo itself is surrounded by small and struggling democracies that are being overwhelmed by the flood of refugees Milosevic's ruthless policies are creating.

Today, this region is the critical missing piece in the puzzle of a Europe whole and free. That vision of a united and democratic Europe is critical to our own security. And it cannot be fulfilled if this part of the continent remains wracked by conflict.

Further, Belgrade's actions constitute a critical test of NATO, whose strength and credibility have defended freedom and ensured our security for five

decades. To paraphrase Senator Chuck Hagel, today, there is a butcher in NATO's backyard, and we have committed ourselves to stopping him. History will judge us harshly if we fail.

For all of these reasons, NATO's decision to use force against the Milosevic regime was necessary and right. And the conditions the alliance has set for ending its campaign are clear, just, and firm.

There must be a verifiable stop to Serb military action against the people of Kosovo. Belgrade's military, police, and paramilitary forces must leave so that refugees can return. An international military presence must be permitted. And the people of Kosovo must be given the democratic self-government they have long deserved. . . .

Mr. Chairman, in dealing with Kosovo prior to the last week of March, we were engaged in diplomacy backed by the threat of force. Since that time, we have used diplomacy to back NATO's military campaign.

Our diplomacy has several objectives. The first is to ensure that NATO remains united and firm. To this end, I met with alliance foreign ministers in Brussels last week. And the President will meet with his counterparts here in Washington at the NATO Summit on Friday and Saturday. To date, we have been heartened by the broad participation and strong support the military campaign has received. In one way or another, every ally is contributing.

Our unity has been strengthened by the knowledge that Milosevic refused a diplomatic settlement and by revulsion at his campaign of ethnic cleansing. No country in NATO wanted to have to use force against Serbia. But no country in NATO is willing to stand by and accept in Europe the expulsion of an entire ethnic community from its home.

Our second diplomatic objective has been to help leaders in the countries directly affected to cope with the humanitarian crisis and to prevent a wider

conflict. To this end, I have been in regular contact with my counterparts from the region. Their leaders will participate as partners in the NATO Summit. And the President's supplemental request includes \$150 million in emergency and project assistance to these nations and to democratic Montenegro.

Our third objective is to work constructively with Russia. We want to continue to make progress in other areas of our relationship and to bring Russia back into the mainstream of international opinion on Kosovo. . . .

Our fourth diplomatic objective has been to ensure that NATO's message is understood around the world. We are engaged in a vigorous program of public diplomacy and have provided information on a regular basis to nations everywhere. . . .

Even as we respond to the crisis in Kosovo, we must also concern ourselves more broadly with the future of the region. The peaceful integration of Europe's north, west, and center is well-advanced or on track. But, as I said earlier, the continent cannot be whole and free until its southeast corner is also stable.

Some say violence is endemic to this region and that its people have never and will never get along. Others say that stability is only possible under the crushing weight of a dominant empire such as the Ottoman, Hapsburg, and communist regimes that once held sway.

I am no prophet. Certainly, the scars of the past are still visible. Certainly, the wounds opened by the current devastation will take much time to heal. But the evidence is there in the testimony of average people whether in Zagreb or Tirana, Sarajevo or Skopje, that they are far more interested in plugging into the world economy than in slugging it out with former adversaries. . . .

The problems that have plagued the Balkans—of competition for resources, ethnic rivalry, and religious intolerance—are by no means restricted to that part of the world. Nor does the region lack the potential to rise above them.

During the NATO Summit, the President and our partners will discuss the need for a coordinated effort to consolidate democracy in southeast Europe, promote economic integration, and provide moral and material support to those striving to build societies based on law and respect for the rights and dignity of all.

Our explicit goal should be to transform the Balkans from the continent's primary source of instability into an integral part of the European mainstream. We do not want the current conflict to be the prelude to others; we want to build a solid foundation for a new generation of peace so that future wars are prevented, economies grow, democratic institutions are strengthened, and the rights of all are preserved. ■

*Remarks at the U.S. Institute for Peace
Washington, DC
February 4, 1999*

. . . Yugoslavia's collapse and descent into violence and brutality began in Kosovo. It was by proclaiming Serbia's right to supreme authority there that Slobodan Milosevic burnished his ultranationalist credentials and began his rise to power. And one of his first acts as President of Serbia, in 1989, was to strip Kosovo of the autonomy it had enjoyed under the Yugoslav constitution. His policies of ethnic polarization and hatemongering in Kosovo ushered in a decade of police repression and human rights abuses throughout Yugoslavia. Those policies led to the breakup of Yugoslavia and to the devastating conflict in Bosnia.

For 10 years, Kosovo's Albanian population fought a courageous, nonviolent campaign to regain the rights they had lost. They earned the admiration of the world and the attention of successive U.S. administrations. In 1992, recognizing the stakes involved, President Bush issued what has become known as the "Christmas warning"—a private but forceful message to President Milosevic not to use force against the civilian population of Kosovo.

But about one year ago, President Milosevic upped the ante by launching a brutal crackdown. Police and military forces were sent in to terrorize civilians, killing hundreds and driving hundreds of thousands from their homes. Under these conditions, many Kosovars abandoned nonviolence and threw

their support to the Kosovo Liberation Army, although its tactics too were sometimes brutal and indiscriminate.

The KLA, as it is known, offers a deceptively simple answer to the tragedy of Kosovo—independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. But there is no guarantee that independence would lead to peace in Kosovo and ample reason to fear that it could undermine stability elsewhere in the region. The best answer is for Kosovo, and all of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to adhere to international standards of human rights for everyone, regardless of ethnicity.

Last fall the region reached crisis, with hundreds of thousands of civilians stranded in the hills and a steady succession of battles and killings. With diplomacy backed by the threat of NATO air strikes, we reached an agreement that averted a humanitarian crisis, slowed the violence, and removed some Serb forces from the region. And we put a 1,000-person OSCE mission on the ground.

Unfortunately, neither the Serbs nor the Kosovo Albanians have ever fully met their obligations. Today the region is again on the verge of massive violence and a human tragedy of immense proportions. . . .

That is why the United States has led the way in NATO and in the Contact Group to build momentum for a political settlement. . . .

We aim to put in place a durable and fair interim agreement that will create a peaceful political framework for Kosovo while deferring the question of Kosovo's status for several years. The people of Kosovo must be able to govern themselves democratically without interference from Belgrade while the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's territorial integrity and sovereignty are maintained. And they must possess all the institutions a democratic government requires—from a legislature and an independent judiciary to a locally controlled police force.

All the ethnic groups of Kosovo, of which there are several in addition to Albanians and Serbs, must be treated fairly. They must be able to control, without government interference, their identities and cultural life. And the rights of individuals of all ethnicities must be fully protected. The right to nourish and promote culture and identity is at the heart of many of the problems in the Balkans.

Finally, to ensure that these principles take effect, authority should devolve as much as possible to local communities so that they have the authority to resolve problems themselves.

We do not expect to resolve all the long-standing and deeply held grievances of both sides; rather, we seek to build a climate in which the people of Kosovo receive the rights and security they have been denied and in which Belgrade has a chance to show that Kosovo can prosper within its borders over a 3-year interim period.

We expect the parties to finish the talks within 7 days or satisfy the Contact Group that significant progress is being made to warrant an extension. At the end of that time, three outcomes are possible. If President Milosevic refuses to accept the Contact Group proposals or has allowed repression in Kosovo to continue, he can expect NATO air strikes. If the Kosovo Albanians obstruct progress at Rambouillet or on the ground, they cannot expect NATO and the international community to bail them out. Decisions on air strikes and international support will be affected, and we will find additional ways of bringing pressure to bear. If the two sides do reach agreement, we will need to concentrate our efforts on making sure that it is successfully implemented.

There should be no doubt on either side that the consequences of failure to reach agreement or to show restraint on the ground will be swift and severe. . . . ■

NATO NATO

*Remarks at the Brookings Institution
Washington, DC
April 6, 1999*

. . . The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was forged in the aftermath of Holocaust and war, by the survivors of war, to prevent war. It reflected our predecessors' determination to defend hard-won freedoms—and their understanding that while weakness invites aggression, strength is a parent to peace.

During its first four decades, NATO's might deterred conflict in the heart of Europe, the scene of so much past horror. But NATO was more than a peacekeeper. The shield it provided allowed post-war economies to rebuild, World War II adversaries to reconcile, and Europe's integration to begin.

In part because of NATO, the Cold War ended as this decade began. Alliance leaders confronted a new set of questions. How would the alliance hold together now that the adversary that had brought it together was gone? If it remained united, what would it do? How should it change? How might the new NATO relate to the new Europe? And what role would Russia play?

President Clinton and his counterparts, with the help of outside experts, including those here at Brookings, have moved steadily but surely to answer these questions. Acting openly and methodically, they have taken steps to modernize and strengthen the alliance, prepare it for new missions, invite new

members, establish partnerships with Europe's new democracies, and develop strategies for the future. . . .

At the Washington Summit, our leaders will focus simultaneously on what has been, what is, and what will be. Drawing inspiration from the past, they will pay tribute to alliance founders and salute those who have sacrificed through the years to keep our region secure, prosperous, and free.

They will focus on the present, including every aspect of the situation in Kosovo and the surrounding region. They will focus on the future, drawing up a blueprint—as the title of today's forum reflects—for the new nation in the new century.

In so doing, they will be guided by the great lesson of the past century, which is that neither North America nor Europe can be secure if the other is not. Our destinies are linked. That is as true now as it was when NATO was founded 50 years ago.

Across the Atlantic, we must stand together and act together as allies when allied action is called for—and as friends in helping to shape a more stable, prosperous, and lawful world. Some suggest that Europe should take care of Europe, freeing America to concentrate on responsibilities elsewhere. But this makes no sense. It would create the twin false impression that America does not care about Europe and Europe does not care about the world.

Moreover, it would weaken us both in and beyond Europe, by depriving the continent of America's valuable role, while leaving America to assume broader burdens that Europe has the resources and responsibility to share. Such a division of labor would also lead to a division of attention and gradually weaken the indispensable transatlantic bond. We had a taste of divided labor in the early years of this decade in Bosnia.

As our unity in Kosovo now reflects, we will not go down that road again. At the summit, our leaders will unveil a revised strategic concept for the alliance that will take into account the variety of future

dangers the alliance may confront. They will commit NATO to developing military forces that can perform the full spectrum of alliance missions.

These include NATO's core mission: the ability to deal with aggression committed directly against one or more NATO members. They include other potential operations, such as those now ongoing in Bosnia and Kosovo. These differ, day to night, from the kind of all-out defense of Europe for which the alliance prepared for so long.

Such operations will likely differ in size and length from missions undertaken in collective self-defense. Hopefully, they will be rare. But as is now the case, there may be more than one ongoing at any given time. They may be conducted jointly with partners or other non-allied nations. By definition, they will involve operations outside alliance territory, with all the logistical complications that entails.

We have already made progress in developing the capabilities required, but gaps remain. Many allies have only a limited ability to deploy forces rapidly outside their country and to sustain them once they arrive. The need is not so much that allies invest more in defense but that we all invest wisely. For example, we need to ensure that command, control, and information systems are well-matched. We need to have forces—not just among a few countries but throughout NATO—that are versatile, flexible, and mobile. Our benchmark is clear. We must also be as good in dealing with new threats as we are in dealing with old.

To these ends, we expect the summit to produce a defense capabilities initiative that will prepare the alliance to field forces designed and equipped for 21st-century missions. We expect, as well, a related initiative that responds to the grave threat posed by weapons of mass destruction—or WMD—and their means of delivery. For we cannot prepare for the future if we do not prepare for the greatest danger of the present and the future.

We also support the strengthening of the European pillar of our alliance. It is in America's interest to see a more integrated Europe, able to act effectively and cohesively, willing to assume a greater share of our common responsibilities. So we welcome and support efforts to improve European capabilities. We have made the point, however, that to be constructive, such initiatives should be linked to NATO, complement existing activities, and be open to all European members of the alliance, whether or not they are in the EU.

Last month, at the Truman Library in Missouri, I was witness to history as NATO gained three new members and America three new allies. For the people of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, it was a homecoming—an irreversible affirmation of their belonging within the democratic community of the West. For the alliance, it was a strengthening, an enhancement of NATO's muscle and reach.

These three new members are NATO's first since the end of the Cold War, but they will not be the last. We are building a future that erases, not replaces, the division of the past. In today's Europe, destiny is no longer determined by geography; nations are deciding their own fates. Around the continent, they have been coming together in support of more open political and economic systems. It is natural and inevitable that, as this occurs, other non-NATO countries will achieve the threshold required for serious consideration as new members. A number have already ascended far along this uphill road.

At the Washington Summit, NATO leaders will welcome this progress and affirm that the door to the alliance remains open. They will announce a concrete and practical plan to help prepare potential new members to meet NATO's high standards. They will assure aspiring members that they will be judged by what they can contribute to the alliance, not by where they sit on Europe's map.

Half a century ago, American leadership helped lift Western Europe to prosperity and democracy. In this decade, the entire transatlantic community is helping Europe's newly free nations to integrate themselves into the economic and security structures of the continent. This is evident in the direct assistance that has been provided by the European Union and our own SEED program and Freedom Support Act. It is evident in the EU's plan to expand and in the new roles and missions of the OSCE. It is evident in the partnerships NATO has forged with Europe's emerging democracies.

At the summit, our leaders will have the opportunity to take these partnerships to a new level. They will consider a framework to guide partner participation in planning, deciding, and implementing certain alliance missions. They will announce a plan to upgrade the forces that partners will have available for future NATO-led operations. The result will be a NATO with wider military options, partner countries with enhanced military capabilities, and a Europe practiced in multiplying NATO strengths by partner strengths to arrive at the product of peace.

The Washington Summit will show how much NATO values its relationships with all of Europe's democracies, including Russia. The inclusion and full participation of each in the transatlantic community is essential to the future we seek. This is true not only from a security standpoint—for in the 21st century, a nation need not be in NATO to work closely with NATO, to share responsibility for Europe's security, to be integrated into Europe's economy, and to reap the benefits of a Europe that is stable and prosperous. . . .■

*Remarks on the occasion of the accession of
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Independence, MO
March 12, 1999*

. . . Today is a day of celebration and rededication and remembrance and renewal. Today we recognize in fact what has always been true in spirit. Today we confirm through our actions that the lands of King Stephen and Cardinal Mindszenty, Charles the Fourth and Vaclav Havel, Copernicus and Pope John Paul II reside fully and irrevocably within the Atlantic community for freedom. And to that I say, to quote an old central European expression, "Hallelujah."

History will record March 12, 1999, as the day the people of Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland strode through NATO's open door and assumed their rightful place in NATO's councils. To them I say that President Clinton's pledge is now fulfilled. Never again will your fates be tossed around like poker chips on a bargaining table. Whether you are helping to revise the alliance's strategic concept or engaging in NATO's partnership with Russia, the promise of "nothing about you without you," is now formalized. You are truly allies; you are truly home.

This is a cause for celebration not only in Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw, but throughout the alliance, for the tightening of transatlantic ties that we mark today inspired the vision of transatlantic leaders half a century ago. That generation, which in Dean Acheson's famous phrase was "present at the creation," emerged from the horror of World War II determined to make another such war impossible.

They had seen—and paid in blood—the price of division; so their policies were inclusive. They wanted to help build a transatlantic community of prosperity and peace that would include all of Europe.

But between the 1947 offering of the Marshall Plan and the forging of NATO 2 years later, it became evident that the reality of their times did not match the boldness of their vision. The Iron Curtain descended, and across the body of Europe, a brutal and unnatural division was imposed. Now, due to bravery on both sides, that curtain has lifted, and links that should have been secured long ago are being soldered together. Today is evidence of that, for this morning, NATO is joined by three proud democracies—countries that have proven their ability to meet alliance responsibilities, uphold alliance values, and defend alliance interests.

Since the decision to invite new members was first made, President Clinton has argued that a larger NATO would make America safer, our alliance stronger, and Europe more peaceful and united. Today, we see that this is already the case, for NATO's new members bring with them many strengths. Their citizens have a tradition of putting their lives on the line for liberty: Witness Hungary's courageous freedom fighters in 1956; the students who faced down tanks in the streets of Prague 12 years later; and the workers of Gdansk whose movement for Solidarity ushered in Europe's new dawn.

As young democracies, these countries have been steadfast in supporting the vision of an integrated Europe. Their troops are serving alongside NATO forces in Bosnia. And each is contributing to stability in its own neighborhood. As a daughter of the region, and a former professor of central and east European affairs, I know many Americans have not always had the understanding of this region that they now do. Earlier this century, when Jan Masaryk, son of the

Czech President, came to the United States, an American Senator asked him: "How is your father; and does he still play the violin?" Jan replied, "Sir, I fear that you are making a small mistake. You are perhaps thinking of Paderewski and not Masaryk. Paderewski plays the piano, not the violin and was President not of Czechoslovakia but of Poland. Of our Presidents, Benes was the only one who played, but he played neither the violin nor the piano, but football. In all other respects, your information is correct."

Later, after his father had died and World War II had been fought, Jan Masaryk became Czechoslovak Foreign Minister—my father's boss. It soon became clear that the revival of Czechoslovak democracy and Czechoslovak aspirations to be part of the West would be short-lived.

Czechoslovakia was also invited to join the Marshall Plan. However, Foreign Minister Masaryk was summoned to Moscow and told that Czechoslovakia had to refuse the invitation. He returned to Prague to tell his colleagues, "I now know I am not the Foreign Minister of a sovereign country." Masaryk's statement reminds us of another great gift the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary bring to our alliance for freedom: the living memory of living without freedom.

NATO's success has enabled generations protected by the alliance to grow up and grow old under democratic rule. For that, we are enormously grateful. But we must also guard against a danger. For there is a risk that to people who have never known tyranny, an alliance forged before they were born to counter an enemy that no longer exists, to defend freedoms some believe are no longer endangered, may appear no more relevant than the fate of central Europe did to some of our predecessors 60 years ago.

The Truman Library is a fit place for plain speaking. So let me speak plainly now. It is the job of each and every one of us, on both sides of the

Atlantic, to bring home to the generations of today and tomorrow the compelling lessons of this century.

We must never fall back into complacency or presume that totalitarianism is forever dead or retreat in the face of aggression. We must learn from history, not repeat it. And we must never forget that the destinies of Europe and North America are inseparable—and that this is as true now as it was when NATO was founded 50 years ago. Of course, there will always be differences between Europe and America. We have been aptly called cousins, but we will never be mistaken for clones. Today, there are splits on trade and other issues—some of which are quite controversial. But do not exaggerate; these are differences within the family.

I think I can speak for each of my alliance colleagues when I say that on the central questions that affect the security and safety of our people, our alliance is and will remain united, as it must, for the hopes of future generations are in our hands. We cannot allow any issue to undermine our fundamental unity. We must adapt our alliance and strengthen our partnerships. We must anticipate and respond to new dangers. And we must not count on second chances; we must get it right—now.

This requires understanding that the more certain we are in preparing our defense, the more certain we may be of defending our freedom without war. NATO is the great proof of that, for its success over five decades is measured not in battles won, but rather in lives saved, freedoms preserved, and wars prevented. That is why President Truman said that the creation of NATO was the achievement in which he took the greatest pride.

Today we, too, have grounds for pride, for NATO enlargement is a sign that we have not grown complacent about protecting the security of our citizens. The nations entering our alliance today are the first new members since the Cold War's end. But they will not be the last, for NATO enlargement is not an event; it is a process. It is our common purpose,

over time, to do for Europe's east what NATO has already helped to do for Europe's west. Steadily and systematically, we will continue erasing without replacing the line drawn in Europe by Stalin's bloody boot.

When President Clinton welcomes his counterparts to Washington next month to mark NATO's 50th anniversary, they will affirm that the door of the alliance does remain open, and they will announce a plan to help prepare aspiring members to meet NATO's high standards.

But enlargement is only one element in our effort to prepare NATO for its second 50 years. The Washington Summit will be the largest gathering of international leaders in the history of Washington, DC. It will include representatives from NATO and its partner countries—44 in all—and it will produce a blueprint for NATO in the 21st century.

Our leaders will, I am confident, agree on the design of an alliance that is not only bigger, but also more flexible; an alliance committed to collective defense and capable of meeting a wide range of threats to its common interests; an alliance working in partnership with other nations and organizations to advance security, prosperity, and democracy in and for the entire Euro-Atlantic region. The centerpiece of the summit will be the unveiling of a revised strategic concept that will take into account the variety of future dangers the alliance may face.

Since 1949, under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, the core mission of our alliance has been collective defense. That must not change and will not change. NATO is a defensive alliance, not a global policeman.

But NATO's founders understood that what our alliance commits us to do under Article V is not all we may be called upon to do or should reserve the right to do. Consider, for example, that when French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman signed the North

Atlantic Treaty, he characterized it as “insurance against all risks—a system of common defense against any attack, whatever its nature.”

During the Cold War, we had no trouble identifying the risks to our security and territory. But the threats we face today and may face tomorrow are less predictable. They could come from an aggressive regime, a rampaging faction, or a terrorist group. And we know that, if past is prologue, we face a future in which weapons will be more destructive at longer distances than ever before.

Our alliance is and must remain a Euro-Atlantic institution that acts by consensus. We must prevent and, if necessary, respond to the full spectrum of threats to alliance interests and values. And when we respond, it only makes sense to use the unified military structure and cooperative habits we have developed over the past 50 years. This approach shouldn’t be controversial. We’ve been practicing it successfully in Bosnia since 1995.

We are also taking steps, as we plan for the summit, to ensure that NATO’s military forces are designed, equipped, and prepared for 21st century missions. And we expect the summit to produce an initiative that responds to the grave threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

Clearly, NATO’s job is different now than when we faced a single monolithic adversary across a single, heavily armed frontier. But NATO’s purpose is enduring. It has not changed. It remains to prevent war and safeguard freedom. NATO does this not only by deterring, but also by unifying. And let no one underestimate its value here, as well—for if NATO can assure peace in Europe, it will contribute much to stability around the globe. . . .

Today, as NATO embarks upon a new era, our energy and vision are directed to the future. But we are mindful, as well, of the past—for as we welcome

three new members, we have a debt we cannot fail to acknowledge.

In this room today are ambassadors and foreign ministers and generals and Members of Congress. In this room, there is great pride and good reason for it. But let us never forget upon whose shoulders we stand. We pay homage to our predecessors and to the millions of soldiers and sailors and aviators and diplomats who, throughout the past half-century, have kept NATO vigilant and strong.

We pay homage, as well, to those who fought for freedom on the far side of freedom's curtain—for the Berlin Wall would be standing today; the Fulda Gap would divide Europe today; the Warsaw Pact would remain our adversary today, if those who were denied liberty for so long, had not struggled so bravely for their rights. Let us never forget that freedom has its price. And let us never fail to remember how our alliance came together, what it stands for, and why it has prevailed. . . . ■

*Testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, DC
April 30, 1998*

Chairman Helms, Senator Biden, members of the committee: It is my high honor to appear with my colleagues to present the protocols of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 that will add Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO. We view the ratification of these protocols as an essential part of a broader strategy to build an undivided, democratic, and peaceful Europe. We believe this goal is manifestly in America's own interest and that it merits your strong support.

We are approaching the culmination of a remarkable process. It began 4 years ago when President Clinton and his fellow NATO leaders decided that the question was not whether NATO would welcome new members but when and how it would do so. It moved forward in Madrid, when, after months of study and deliberation, the alliance agreed that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic would make NATO stronger and met every qualification for membership. It advanced 2 weeks ago, when President Clinton transmitted to the Congress the documents that will, with your consent, make these three nations America's newest allies. . . .

If the Senate agrees, NATO will, for the first time, step across the line it was created to defend and overcome—the line that once so cruelly and arbitrarily divided Europe into east and west.

During the Cold War, I'm sure some of you had the strange experience of seeing that line up close. There were bunkers and barbed wire, minefields, and soldiers in watchtowers fixing you in their crosshairs. On one side were free people, living in sovereign countries; on the other were people who wanted to be free, living in countries being suffocated by communism.

Go to the center of Europe today, and you would have to use all the powers of your imagination to conjure up these images of that very recent past. There are still borders, of course, but they are there to manage the flow of trucks and tour buses, not to stop troops and tanks. On both sides, people vote and speak and buy and sell freely. Governments cooperate with one another. Soldiers train and serve together. The legacy of the past is still visible east of the old divide, but in the ways that matter, the new democracies are becoming indistinguishable from their western neighbors.

We are here today, Mr. Chairman, because the status quo in Europe was shattered by the geopolitical equivalent of an earthquake. That earthquake presented us with a dual challenge: first, how to preserve a favorable security environment into the next century; and second, how to seize the opportunity to build a Europe whole and free.

In meeting that challenge, NATO faced a blunt choice. Would our alliance be the last institution in Europe to continue to treat the Iron Curtain as something meaningful? Or would it aid in Europe's reunification and renewal? Would it exclude from its ranks a whole group of qualified democracies simply because they had been subjugated in the past? Or would it be open to those free nations that are willing and able to meet the responsibilities of membership and to contribute to our security?

I believe NATO made the right choice. NATO's decision to accept qualified new members will make America safer, NATO stronger, and Europe more stable and united.

We recognize, Mr. Chairman, that the decision to build a larger NATO has implications for our security that must be weighed carefully. It involves solemn commitments. It is not cost-free. It can only be justified if it advances America's strategic interests.

. . . I will try to summarize that case today and then focus on the questions and concerns that may still exist.

First, a larger NATO will make America safer by expanding the area of Europe where wars do not happen. By making it clear that we will fight, if necessary, to defend our new allies, we make it less likely that we will ever be called upon to do so.

Is central Europe in immediate jeopardy today? It is not. But can we safely say that our interest in its security will never be threatened? History and experience do not permit us to say that, Mr. Chairman.

There is, after all, the obvious risk of ethnic conflict. There is the growing danger posed by rogue states with dangerous weapons. There are still questions about the future of Russia. Whatever the future may hold, it is hardly in our interest to have a group of vulnerable and excluded states in the heart of Europe. It will be in our interest to have a vigorous and larger alliance with those European democracies that share our values and our determination to defend them.

A second reason is that the very prospect of a larger NATO has given the nations of central and eastern Europe an incentive to solve their own problems. To align themselves with NATO, aspiring allies have strengthened their democratic institutions, improved respect for minority rights, made sure soldiers take orders from civilians, and resolved virtually every old border and ethnic dispute in the region. This is the kind of progress that can ensure outside powers are never again dragged into conflict in this region. This is the kind of progress that will continue if the Senate says yes to a larger NATO.

A third reason why enlargement passes the test of national interest is that it will make NATO itself stronger and more cohesive. Our prospective allies are passionately committed to NATO. Experience has taught them to believe in a strong American role in Europe. Their forces have risked their lives alongside ours from the Gulf war to Bosnia. They will add strategic depth to the alliance, not to mention well over 200,000 troops. . . .

One concern that I want to address today is that adding new members to NATO could diminish the effectiveness of the alliance and make it harder to reach decisions—in short, that it could dilute NATO. But we have pursued NATO enlargement in a way that will make the alliance stronger, not weaker.

This is why we have insisted that any nations wishing to join NATO must meet the strict conditions that former Secretary of Defense Perry enunciated in 1995: They must be market democracies with civilian control of the military, have good relations with neighbors, and have the ability to contribute to NATO's mission of collective defense. This is why when President Clinton went to the Madrid summit last July, he insisted that only the strongest candidates be invited to join in this first round. As you know, the President was under some pressure, both at home and abroad, to agree to four or five new allies. He agreed to three, because we are determined to preserve NATO's integrity and strength. . . .

Mr. Chairman, let me take a few moments to discuss one final key concern: the impact of a larger NATO on Russia and on our ties with that country. I want to stress that this concern has to do mostly with perceptions, not reality. And while perceptions can be important, our policies must follow from what we know to be true.

For example, there is a common perception that we are moving NATO, its tanks and bombers, and even its nuclear weapons right up to Russia's borders, and that therefore Russia has a reason to be threatened by a larger NATO. The reality is quite different.

Proximity is not the issue. Russia and NATO have shared a common border since 1949—both Russia and Norway know this is nothing new. There are no tensions along the border between Poland and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea coast. Hungary and the Czech Republic, meanwhile, are closer to France than they are to the nearest corner of Russian soil.

As for weaponry, NATO has announced that in the current and foreseeable security environment, it has no plan, no need, and no intention to station nuclear weapons in the new member countries, nor does it contemplate permanently stationing substantial combat forces. Just as important, the prospect of joining NATO has given our future allies the confidence to avoid arms buildups and to work constructively to establish lower limits on conventional forces. Their ties with Russia are more normal and cooperative today than at any time in history.

If we did not enlarge NATO, exactly the opposite could happen. The central European nations would feel isolated and insecure. They would undoubtedly spend more on defense, and they might reject regional arms control. As Senator Biden has pointed out, they would probably create their own mutual security arrangements, which might well be anti-Russian in character. Ironically, the problems Russia fears a larger NATO will cause are precisely the problems a larger NATO will avoid. . . .■

*Statement before the North Atlantic Council
Brussels, Belgium
February 18, 1997*

. . . To judge NATO's future potential, we must understand fully its past accomplishments—for NATO has always been more than a defensive shield: It was the roof over our heads when we rebuilt post-war Europe; it was the floor upon which the first structures of European unity were laid; it was the door through which one-time adversaries were welcomed into our family of democracies. And because of its strength and the courage of its members, it has been a mighty deterrent to aggression.

Today, we are privileged to live at a time of relative stability and peace. But we know from history that we cannot take the extension of these blessings for granted. Peace is not a gift; it must be earned and re-earned. And if it is to last, it must be constantly reinforced.

That is why, through our joint efforts, NATO—a great instrument of peace—has been transformed to meet the demands of a new era. Our military forces and strategy have changed. No longer is NATO arrayed in opposition to any one enemy; its mission is peace and cooperation with all who wish to walk with it.

To this end, the alliance has sparked unprecedented collaboration on European security through the Partnership for Peace. It has adapted to new roles, including the historic mission in Bosnia, which has halted the terrible carnage there and

mobilized a remarkable coalition to help implement the Dayton accords. It has undertaken a program of internal adaptation which offers greater visibility and responsibility to European members. The prospect of its enlargement has contributed to the resolution of historic differences involving borders and minority rights in central and eastern Europe. In so doing, NATO has helped bring within our grasp the most elusive dream of this century: an undivided Europe, at peace, in which every nation is free and every free nation is a partner.

This vision of Europe is not the property of any one nation or group; it is an aspiration shared across the continent and on both sides of the Atlantic. It is being realized through the efforts not only of NATO but of the European Union—EU, the OSCE, the Western European Union—WEU, the Council of Europe—CE, and democratic reformers in every affected nation.

This is critical; for increasingly in this new era, security will not rest on a single pillar. It must be supported by democratic institutions and values; bolstered by the wealth of free peoples freely engaged in production, agriculture, and commerce; and glued together by habits of cooperation and consultation on matters of mutual interest.

So as we contemplate the next phase in the evolution of NATO, we understand that its development is part of, and complementary to, a larger process. But we also understand that if we are to achieve for Europe the kind of future we all want, we have to manage the evolution of this alliance correctly. We have to get it right.

That is why we have charted our course carefully, moved ahead deliberately, and acted together. It is why we have chosen as our common purpose to do for Europe's east what NATO did 50 years ago for Europe's west: to integrate new democracies, eliminate old hatreds, provide confidence in economic recovery, and deter conflict.

And it is why the road ahead is clear. Let there be no doubt:

- NATO will complete its internal adaptation;
- It will begin accession talks;
- It will accept new members;
- It will create an Atlantic Partnership Council and keep the door to membership open;
- It will have an enhanced relationship with Ukraine; and
- It will do all it can to forge a long-term strategic partnership with Russia.

Our adherence to this course will keep NATO evolving and modernizing through the remaining years of this century and into the next. We must stay that course. We must stand by our commitments. And I am confident we will do so. . . .

I have said that the vision of a united and democratic Europe has been elusive, and that it extends back decades in history. That reality could not better be illustrated than in a speech delivered 50 years ago by Mr. Winston Churchill. The aims he spoke of then bear a striking resemblance to the aims we speak of now.

It is not our task or wish to draw
frontier lines,

he said,

but rather to smooth them away. Our aim is to bring about the unity of all the nations of all Europe. We seek to exclude no state whose territory lies in Europe and which assures to its people those fundamental . . . liberties on which our democratic civilization has been created.

He went on to say that:

Some countries will feel able to come into our circle sooner and others later according to the circumstances in which

they are placed. They can all be sure that, whenever they are to join, a place and a welcome will be waiting for them at the European council table.

Twice before in this century, we have faced the challenge, in the aftermath of war, of building together a free, secure, and united Europe. We had the opportunity after World War I, but too many, in the United States and elsewhere, lacked the vision.

After World War II, as Churchill's remarks illustrate, and the memory of Marshall, Monnet, Bevin, Adenauer, and their counterparts bears witness, there was no shortage of vision. But across half of Europe, the opportunity was denied.

Today, we have both the vision and the opportunity, and together we are building that Europe. It will be my great privilege to work with you, on behalf of President Clinton and the American people, as we continue with this historic task. And by our success, we will ensure that the next century begins with a solid foundation for lasting liberty and enduring peace. ■

Russia Russia

45

*Remarks at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace
Washington, DC
September 16, 1999*

. . . Since the Cold War ended, first President Bush and then President Clinton have pursued two basic goals in our relations with Russia. The first is to increase the safety of the American people by working to reduce Cold War arsenals, stop proliferation, and create a stable and undivided Europe. The second is to support Russia's effort to transform its political, economic, and social institutions at home. Neither of these goals has been fully achieved. But neither has been lost. Each remains a work in progress. We remain determined to work with Russia and our allies to accomplish each.

We are under no illusions that this will happen overnight, nor do we underestimate the grave obstacles that exist. Russia is in the midst of a wrenching transition, made far more difficult by its long history of highly centralized and, in this century, totalitarian rule.

Eight years ago, when I was still a professor, I participated in a survey of attitudes toward democracy and a market system in Russia. It was around the time the Soviet Union broke up. We found the Russian people eager for change in the abstract, but as Pushkin wrote in a different context, "lost in the snowstorm" about what democracy would mean. They seemed poorly prepared for capitalism. The idea of rewarding more productive work with higher

pay was alien. Dependence on the state was deeply ingrained. People had no experience with competitive markets. They were deeply divided not only by ethnicity but also by age, gender, level of education, and urban from rural.

My conclusion at the time was that transforming Russia into a functioning pluralist society with a market system would be a “herculean task.” Today, we hear some say the job is not only herculean but hopeless. I obviously don’t agree.

Russia’s future course is uncertain. A flood of forces, many in opposition to each other, have been unleashed. Currents of free enterprise, initiative, and greater freedom compete with those of corruption and crime. Impulses toward integration and openness vie with tendencies toward isolation and alienation. Time will tell which of these prevail. All we can be sure of now is that the result will be distinctively Russian and that it will depend ultimately far less on decrees handed down in Moscow—or on the advice of outsiders—than on the decisions made and opinions formed in Russia’s classrooms, farms, factories, and livingrooms.

It is grounds for encouragement, then, that the Russian people have, at every opportunity, made clear their rejection both of the Soviet past and a dictatorial future—despite their dissatisfaction with the muddy present. They have yet to see democracy produce, but they have not abandoned democracy’s promise. . . .

Since 1992, our support has helped to deactivate almost 5,000 nuclear warheads in the former Soviet Union, eliminate nuclear weapons from three former Soviet Republics, strengthen the security of nuclear weapons and materials at more than 100 sites, and purchase more than 60 tons of highly enriched uranium that could have been used by terrorists or outlaw states to build nuclear weapons. A number of

these accomplishments are directly attributable to the work of our binational commission with Russia, chaired on our side by Vice President Gore.

Despite these steps, the job of preventing “loose nukes” is far from complete. That is why the overwhelming majority of our assistance dollars to Russia go to programs that lower the chance that weapons of mass destruction or sensitive missile technology will fall into the wrong hands.

It is why President Clinton announced in January the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative. This includes measures to help Russia tighten export controls, improve security over its arsenals, and provide opportunities for more than 30,000 former Soviet weapons scientists to participate in peaceful commercial and research ventures. . . .

Throughout this decade, we have tried to work with Russia, our allies, and partners to build a Europe that is secure, stable, and free from the divisions that have endangered our own security on numerous occasions during this century.

It remains premature to say what kind of long-term relationship Russia will have with its neighbors, but the progress made during the past decade has been astonishing.

If one of the scholars in this room had predicted in 1990 that, by century’s end, there would be no Russian forces in the Baltics or central Europe, that Russia would have established a formal partnership with NATO and the EU, and that Russian troops would be serving side-by-side with Americans in Bosnia and Kosovo—I suspect that Carnegie would have politely forwarded the resume of that farsighted scholar to Brookings.

As this audience is well aware, progress with Russia in Europe has not occurred easily or by accident. Russia had differences with us in Bosnia, opposed NATO expansion, and denounced the allied air campaign over Kosovo. At the same time, we

continue to press Russia to join in supporting effective UN Security Council action toward Iraq and to recognize that Serbia cannot end its isolation as long as Slobodan Milosevic is in power.

Such disagreements have led to predictions that the spirit of pragmatic cooperation between Russia and the West will crash and burn. At some point, the pessimists may be proven right. But the relationship has survived headwinds, turbulence, and even a midair turnaround—and is still aloft.

The reason has little to do with sentiment and much to do with common sense. Although many still refuse to admit it, the zero-sum world of the Cold War is truly gone. Future progress will depend not on dominating others, but on forging partnerships aimed at shared security and economic growth. The greatest opportunities will reside in a healthy global economy fueled by openness and expanded trade. And the most serious threats will be posed by proliferation, regional strife and. . .terror. . . .

The second overriding objective in our policy toward Russia is to encourage its full transition to political democracy, a healthy market economy, and the rule of law. This reinforces our security goals, because a stable and democratic Russia is more likely to be a good partner on arms control and questions of international security and peace.

But as we know from our own experience, building democracy is hard. It is especially tough when you are emerging from a long history of totalitarian rule. The Poles said of the post Cold War challenge in their own country, “The Communists showed us how to turn an aquarium into fish soup. Now, we have to figure out how to turn the soup back into an aquarium.”

Unlike Poland, Russia doesn’t have the advantage of a democratic model from the past. This has made it harder for the Russian people to recognize and unite around shared goals.

But if anything unites Russians it is the desire to see their country respected. This is wholly legitimate, given Russia's history and past achievements. The question Russians must deal with is how to define their country's greatness anew in the 21st century.

Certainly, success cannot come through a return to some version of the failed systems of the past. It cannot come at the expense of Russia's neighbors or through isolation or hibernation. It can only come through Russia's ability, over a period of years, to build a vibrant democratic society at home and play an honored role in world affairs. Fortunately, democratic habits are among the world's most benign addictions, and are starting to spread in Russia.

It is easy to forget that a decade ago, the Communist Party was still the only one allowed by the constitution. Today, there is a whole lot of democracy going on. Russians enjoy greater liberties than at any time in history. The press is outspoken and varied, civil society is expanding rapidly, and Russians have grown accustomed to voting regularly and speaking their minds freely.

In December, critical parliamentary elections are scheduled. And Russia's first- ever democratic transfer of power is anticipated as a result of the presidential election next summer.

America's role will be to support the democratic principles that underlie the elections. USAID will continue its work with NGOs to help provide the infrastructure for elections that are free and fair. We want the will of the Russian people to be expressed, because nothing could do more damage to Russia, at home or abroad, than a failure to observe the constitutional process. And nothing could do more to cement Russia's place among the world's democracies than the constitutional election and inauguration of Boris Yeltsin's successor. Unfortunately, the new Russian Government will inherit some old problems.

The worst fears of a year ago have been avoided, but the Russian people are still suffering great hardships. Many are poor; wages are low; pensions are often delayed; health care is scarce. Democratic institutions are fragile, and there is about as much public faith in the banking system as there is in the legal system, which is to say almost none.

It is true that devaluation of the ruble has raised the price of imports and thereby revived production for the home market in some sectors, but the seeds of long-term growth have hardly taken root. And the deadweight of corruption is holding Russia back.

Although some have suggested that the problem of corruption originated with the post Cold War democratic reforms, that is not the case. Corruption flourished under the Czars and thrived under the Soviets but as a state monopoly. The problem now is that Russia has gone from a system with too many bad rules to one with not enough good rules. And without the rule of law firmly in place, foreign investors have hesitated, capital has taken flight, the influential few have distorted markets, and the economy has sagged.

For years, America has tried to help Russia move toward a higher road. In 1993, USAID launched a rule of law project to draft a new civil code, a criminal code, bankruptcy laws, and a legal and regulatory framework that allows Russia's Securities and Exchange Commission to function.

In 1995, President Clinton, in Moscow, called for "a market based on law, not lawlessness." In 1996, Strobe Talbott told the U.S.-Russia Business Council that "President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin must bring under control the epidemic of crime and corruption." In 1997, Vice President Gore took the lead in pressing Russia to enact money laundering and anti-crime legislation. The same year, Deputy Treasury Secretary Larry Summers declared "we must recognize that a successful campaign against crime and corruption [in Russia] must begin

at the top.” And in a speech last year, I stressed that foreign funds “should be used to help the neediest Russians, not enrich foreign bank accounts.”

Unfortunately, the response from Russian authorities has not been adequate. President Yeltsin’s government needs—at last—to make fighting corruption a priority. The Russian legal system remains no match for well-connected criminals, and the tentacles of Russian organized crime have spread far beyond the nation’s borders. . . .

In the days to come, we will need to work even more vigorously with those in Russia who want to create the “good rules” their society needs. This includes enacting anti-crime and money-laundering legislation. It includes financial sector reforms that stress transparency and accountability. It includes judicial training and advice on fair and efficient tax collection. It includes developing and enforcing standards to prevent conflicts of interest in government. And it includes helping small and medium-sized businesses to escape the shadow of the monopolies and become a driving force in Russia’s economy.

But we also need to keep our heads about us. It is right to focus on the cloud of corruption in Russia, as we have been doing for some time. But it is not the whole picture.

Today, in Russia, unlike the past, allegations of corruption, incompetence, and other shortcomings are lodged against even the highest levels openly and often. The press and public can investigate, criticize, and question. This fall, in the regions of Russia most notorious for corruption, political leaders face challengers who have made clean government their rallying cry.

This seems normal to us, but in Russia, it is revolutionary. And when coupled with the growing emergence of the post-Soviet generation and Russia’s ongoing search for a new and honored national identity, as evidenced by their pride in observing this year the 200th anniversary of Pushkin’s birth, it holds

the promise of positive change. These are reasons to increase our efforts with Russia, not—as some suggest—to cut our aid and walk away.

Obviously, we shouldn't send good money after bad policy, but neither should we turn our backs on good people doing the right things. And that is precisely who and what our aid programs are designed to support.

Unfortunately, Congress is proposing a 25%-30% cut in the amount President Clinton has requested for programs in Russia and elsewhere in the New Independent States next year. This would require unacceptable and self-defeating tradeoffs. And it ignores the fact that our programs directly serve important American interests and values.

We have made clear that we will not support further multilateral assistance to Russia unless fully adequate safeguards are in place. And we have always kept a close eye on our bilateral aid.

As I noted earlier, most of this bilateral assistance supports non-proliferation. This is critical because each nuclear warhead safely dismantled; each ton of highly enriched uranium that is secured; each nuclear scientist that is put to work on a civilian project makes our world a little less dangerous. The remainder of our programs are designed primarily to strengthen democracy at the grassroots where Russia's future direction will be determined. . . .

Some might say that our modest programs cannot affect much in a nation as large as Russia. I would say that a small difference has the potential to make all the difference when the cause is just and the time is right.

Earlier this year, I had the chance to meet with representatives of the civil society in Moscow. I found among them a fierce commitment to democracy, free press, religious tolerance, and the rights of women. They also expressed deep appreciation for the assistance we have provided. These champions of human rights are not ready to quit on Russia, and we should not quit on them.

I told them that the American people know it is in our interests for Russia to succeed. And that we want to see a Russia with legal structures that ensure due process for everyone, including dedicated activists such as Alexander Nikitin. We want to see a Russia where bigotry is shunned and anti-Semitism everywhere condemned. We want to see a Russia as renowned for its freedom as for its culture, music, literature, and the bravery of its people.

I know what the cynics may say, but I believe the ongoing surge in non-governmental organizations in Russia is a big deal. As Sergei Kovalyov, the eminent human rights advocate has said, "the quality of democracy depends on the quality of democrats. We have to wait for a critical mass of people with democratic principles to accumulate." He said, "It's like a nuclear explosion: the critical mass has to accrue."

No one can predict when, or if, that day will come. Certainly, it will not come immediately. Probably, it will not come suddenly, but rather in fits and starts. But it most assuredly will not come at all if we, who championed liberty through five decades of Cold War, desert liberty's cause in Russia now. . . .

It is beyond our prerogative and our power to determine Russia's future, but we can shape our own policy. We can be hostile and dismissive toward Russia and risk recreating our enemy, or we can explore with vision and persistence the full possibilities of this new era.

In choosing the latter course, we will continue to encourage Russia's integration with the West. We will fulfill our joint responsibility with Russia to safeguard the world from nuclear war. We will help Russia to find its place in a new Europe without walls, wholly at peace and fully free. And we will extend our hand to the Russian people as they strive—after 1,000 years of history—to consolidate the institutions of freedom in their great land. . . .■

*Address to the U.S.-Russia Business Council
Chicago, IL
October 2, 1998*

... We cannot say with confidence that Russia will emerge from its difficulties anytime soon. Nor should we assume the worst, for there are still plenty of people in Russia who will fight against turning back the clock.

A true and lasting transition to normalcy, democracy, and free markets in Russia is neither inevitable nor impossible. It is an open question, the subject of a continuing debate and struggle. That has been true ever since this great but wounded nation began to awake from its totalitarian nightmare, and it will be true for years to come. That is why our policy must continue to be guided by patience, realism, and perspective. . . .

Today's democratic reformers cannot afford to leave their work half finished, because Russia cannot afford to be half free. But to beat the odds, they must still beat the legacy they inherited from the last failed effort to transform Russia. And to understand their task, we need to understand just how hard overcoming the legacy of communism has been and will be.

We need to remember that a short time ago, Russia was a country where enterprises competed to produce the biggest piles of junk; a country where the dollar was at once illegal and supreme; a country that did not care for its poor because it did not acknowledge their existence; a country where crime and graft were jealously guarded state monopolies; a country where schoolbooks derided the rule of law as "bourgeois legalism. . . ."

We have an interest in standing by those Russians who are struggling to build a more open and prosperous society. As President Clinton made clear at the Moscow Summit, we will continue to do that in every way we can. At the same time, we should acknowledge that helping Russia will probably be harder for some time. And the best way to help Russia now is not necessarily to send more money.

Much of the progress Russia has made in the last 7 years has come with the support of international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. These institutions helped Russia to conquer hyperinflation, to liberalize prices, and to make the ruble convertible. They pressed policies designed to encourage competition and discourage corruption.

At the same time, more big bailouts are not by themselves going to restore investor confidence in Russia. Nor will they help the Russian economy unless the Russian Government is committed to sound fiscal and monetary policies.

Foreign funds should continue to be used to help Russia pursue credible reforms but not to help delay them. They should be used to support a policy of tax reform, not to make up for tax revenues the government is unable or unwilling to collect. They should be used to support a program that strengthens banks lending money to entrepreneurs, not banks set up to bet on currency fluctuations. They should be used to support policies that help the neediest Russians, not that enrich offshore bank accounts.

In the long run, the gap between Russia's needs and its resources must be met not by foreign bailouts but by foreign investment. Furthermore, what will truly help Russia now is not more people betting on its T-Bills but more people betting on its factories, oil fields, and people.

We need to remember that Russia has tremendous inherent wealth. Yet it has only attracted a trickle of outside investment where there should have been a bonanza. Had the conditions been right, it is

estimated that investors could have pumped more than \$50 billion into Russia's oil and gas sector alone. As it was, in 1997, energy investment didn't even reach \$2 billion.

Just think how much could have been done if investment on this scale had been coming into Russia from the very beginning of the 1990s. Those who blocked it have a lot of explaining to do to their people.

One of the obstacles has been Russia's inability to approve adequate legislation on production-sharing agreements and to create a stable, predictable tax system, which would create an environment for attracting investment.

A related obstacle has been the sense among many Russians that accepting foreign investment means selling their country. President Clinton and I have been making the case that this is a dangerously shortsighted view. We have pointed out that foreign investment has fueled growth in every thriving emerging economy from Latin America to central Europe, that it helped build America in the 19th century, and that attracting foreign capital to America is one of our highest priorities today.

By welcoming long-term, committed capital, Russia is not giving away its national patrimony; it is gaining jobs, growth, and tax revenues. It is gaining advances in technology that will allow it to market its resources at competitive prices. It is gaining a corporate culture that will help it to replace robber barons with responsible stewards of its national treasure. It is gaining investors who will not fly home or move their money to Switzerland at the first sign of trouble. I gather that some of those who are beginning to understand all this include Russia's governors—who see, like our own governors, how much foreign investment can do for them. . . .

From the beginning of Russia's incredible journey toward freedom, I've tried not to be too euphoric when things are going well or too discouraged when things are going badly. Everything I know

about transition from communism to democracy teaches me to be a short-term realist when it comes to Russia. But it also teaches me to be a long-term optimist.

This period is different from all the other periods of change and reform in Russia's history in one important way. Unlike Peter the Great's time, Russia is not seeking to enter a Europe of absolute monarchies in perpetual conflict. Unlike in 1917, it does not need to escape from a Europe engulfed in the senseless slaughter of a total war.

Yesterday, Europe was organized around alliances of countries that knew what they were against. Today, the rest of Europe and much of the world is coming together around a consensus for open markets, for cleaner government, for greater tolerance and peace. In the late 20th century, the forces that pull Russia toward integration and that counteract the autarkic, self-isolating forces within Russia itself are more powerful than at any time in history.

It is our job—because it is in our interest—to manage the aftermath of the Soviet Empire's disintegration, to help Russia integrate into the community of which we are a part, and eventually to help Russia thrive, not just muddle along. And that means remaining steady in defense of our principles, interests, and objectives. And it means standing with Russia as it moves forward—as long as it is moving on the right track.

I will continue to dedicate my best efforts to this hard-headed, principled enterprise, and I solicit yours as well. ■

Bosnia Bosnia

*Remarks at Annual Fleet Week Gala,
Intrepid Sea-Air-Space Museum
New York City
May 22, 1997*

. . . I am reminded of something that Senator Arthur Vandenberg said during Senate debate on the Marshall Plan 49 years ago. He said:

The greatest nation on earth either justifies or surrenders its leadership. We are entirely surrounded by calculated risks. I profoundly believe that the pending program is the best of those risks. I have no quarrel with those who disagree, because we are dealing with imponderables. But I [cannot] . . . say to those who disagree that they have escaped to safety by rejecting or subverting this plan. They have simply fled to other risks, and I fear far greater ones. For myself, I can only say that I prefer my choice of responsibilities.

Tonight, as Secretary of State, I can only say that compared to the risks of failing to lead, the Clinton Administration prefers the risks and responsibilities of leadership in Bosnia.

Today and in days to come, we will be rededicating ourselves to the goal of implementing the Dayton Accords and to a single Bosnian state with two multiethnic entities. We affirm that our commitment to Bosnia's future is long term and will continue well after SFOR departs. . . .

Next week, in Portugal, I will be meeting with my counterparts to discuss steps we can take together to re-energize the Dayton process. Immediately thereafter, I will travel to Sarajevo, Brcko, Banja Luka, and other locations in the region with the message that President Clinton has approved a series of measures to encourage further and more rapid progress toward the core goals of Dayton. Those goals include:

1. Promoting a stable military situation to minimize prospects for renewed fighting;
2. Improving the ability of local law enforcement authorities to provide public security;
3. Advancing the development of democratic institutions that govern in accordance with the rule of law;
4. Securing the safe return of more refugees and displaced persons to their homes and enabling Bosnians to move freely throughout their country;
5. Bringing to justice more of the persons who have been indicted for war crimes and other atrocities; and
6. Enhancing economic reconstruction and inter-entity commerce.

Overall, our goal is a democratic and united Bosnia within a democratic and united Europe. To build that Bosnia, we will need the continued leadership and help of our allies in Europe and our friends from around the world. We will need to maintain our own cohesion and move ahead on diplomatic, security, and economic fronts simultaneously.

We will need the cooperation of all parties to Dayton, including the Governments of Serbia and Croatia. Experience tells us that such cooperation will not come easy or without use of economic and political leverage. The currents of extremism that fueled the Balkans war remain strong both in Belgrade and Zagreb.

To these two governments, the message from the United States is clear: If you build real democracy, respect human and minority rights—those of Albanians in Kosovo as well as Serbs in Croatia—respect international law, and fulfill the obligations of Dayton, including the obligation to comply fully with the War Crimes Tribunal, you will be welcomed into Western economic and political institutions. But if you fail to cooperate with Dayton, you will remain outside the mainstream. No movement will be possible on outer-wall sanctions on Serbia. Zagreb will face increasing opposition to further integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.

Within Bosnia, we will move ahead with renewed energy to assist those who want our help in enabling their country to have the full attributes of a single national community.

For example, while SFOR will remain principally focused on enforcing the military aspects of the Dayton Accords, it will build on its accomplishments by actively supporting crucial civil implementation tasks, within its mandate and capabilities. These include helping to create a secure environment for managed refugee returns and the installation of elected officials in targeted areas and specific economic reconstruction projects which could include inter-entity telecommunications and restoring civil aviation.

Full implementation must be our goal in all sectors, and the parties cannot pick and choose those elements that they prefer at the expense of others. If they are not complying on key implementation tasks, it will not be business as usual for their politicians or their military leaders. For example, if the parties do not comply with arms control obligations, SFOR will have the option to restrict military movements and training.

Obviously, the international community cannot impose cooperation in Bosnia. We cannot make every city, village, and person embrace the concept of a

unified Bosnia. But those who reject that concept will not receive our help. Nor will they see their vision of a separatist future fulfilled. There is no alternative to Dayton. Bosnians should either join the effort to make it work or get out of the way. The only aid we will provide or support for Bosnia is aid that helps build a unified country or that helps people who are helping Dayton succeed. The initiatives for moving forward on the core purposes of Dayton that I will discuss tonight were conceived with precisely this principle in mind. . . .

In the future, we will explore options for providing additional aid to open cities ranging from direct economic help to projects aimed at the preservation of natural resources and the environment. SFOR is looking at how it can assist. And we will urge our allies and the international financial institutions to make a special effort to help. We want every city that chooses to be an "open city" to be a city with a future, a city with friends.

One city where it is especially critical that residents work for unity and peace is Brcko. Because of its strategic location and the terrible ethnic cleansing that occurred there, a peaceful, multiethnic Brcko would be a powerful symbol to the rest of Bosnia and a springboard toward success for the entire Dayton process.

Our goal in Brcko, as in Bosnia more generally, is to reconnect what has been disconnected, to restore the flow of transportation, communication, commerce, and social interaction among the various ethnic communities within the country.

Although there are those who resist this surgery, they offer no viable alternative to it. We believe that more and more Bosnians are coming to accept that restoring the natural circulation of things and people within their country will benefit all segments of the population and that this is the only—I repeat the only—means by which they may build a decent future for themselves and for their families.

A nation cannot be a democracy without free expression. And the absence of free expression has made it much harder for Bosnia to be a nation. The virus of intolerance thrives in an environment in which information is controlled and the party line is the only line most people ever hear. Since Dayton—despite Dayton—officially controlled media have spewed forth misinformation designed to fuel hate. Meanwhile, independent journalists have been brutalized and harassed.

This is unacceptable. To help reverse the tide, the U.S. will be expanding broadcasts of RFE and VOA programming in Bosnia through partnership agreements with local stations. And we will continue to support the emergence of independent television and radio facilities. Our goal, which I am announcing today, is to ensure that by the end of this year, every sizable community in every part of Bosnia has access to independent radio or television reporting.

I am also announcing today that the U.S. Information Agency plans to reopen the Fulbright program with Bosnia for the 1998-99 academic year with an emphasis on journalism and the rule of law.

Finally, the United States will make it clear in every meeting with our partners in the peace implementation process and in every meeting with the parties themselves that the protection of free expression is essential and that the human, civil, and legal rights of all journalists should be protected.

Just as a free press is a necessary component of democracy, so is the rule of law. And establishment of the rule of law is vital to Bosnia's integration as a peaceful and productive society.

Building professional police and judicial institutions in Bosnia is different from attempting the same task in a nation such as Haiti. In Bosnia, the challenge is not so much a matter of education as it is a matter of attitude. For decades in this region, the purpose of the police was to control communities, not to serve them. Our goal, working with UN police monitors,

has been to establish a new tradition based on democratic standards not only for police, but for lawyers, judges, and the entire legal system. We have made progress, but much remains to be done. To date, the United States has contributed the lion's share to police and judicial reform efforts. Now we are looking to our partners to contribute an additional \$80 million in equipment, training, and funds to build on this progress. We also are proceeding with plans to establish a police academy in the Federation.

Another important component of the rule of law pertains to war crimes. The International War Crimes Tribunal was created to reinforce the principle that ethnic cleansing, mass murder, mass rape, torture, and brutal and degrading treatment are not mere tactics of war; they are crimes—and, whether inflicted by the winners or losers of armed conflict, those who commit those crimes should be held accountable.

In practice, the Tribunal faces formidable obstacles. Unlike the court a half-century ago at Nuremberg, the accused are not surrendered prisoners. To gain access to the indicted, prosecutors depend on the help, in most cases, of the very entities in whose name the crimes were committed. The Clinton Administration understands that if peace is to endure in Bosnia, there must be justice. The ability of the Tribunal to gain access to additional indictees is vital to the success of Dayton. It would strengthen the rule of law, soften the bitterness of victims' families, and remove an obstacle to cooperation among parties to the Dayton Accords.

Accordingly, as I have said, we have made compliance by all parties with the obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal a prerequisite to our assistance, our support for assistance by others, and our backing for membership in international institutions. . . .

In summary, the Clinton Administration's purpose is to help renew the momentum of the peace process in Bosnia so that it becomes irreversible and so that each of the parties has a clearly understood stake in its success. Working with our partners, we will help create institutions that improve the security of all, permit more displaced persons and refugees to return home, enhance civil liberties, and allow the institutions of a single, multiethnic, and democratic state to take root. ■